This is a good antidote to the kind of technological determinism which is a frequent substitute for strategic thinking. It recognises instead the importance of social and economic consequences of new technologies and, crucially, that they take a long time to play out. It is slightly weaker on introducing a new emphasis on data to the discussion, rightly recognising that traditional legal and regulatory models don’t easily fit the dispersed complexity of data, but perhaps missing the thought that data is already showing strong signs of following the stages towards organisational capture described by Tim Wu in one of the books which are the foundation for this article.
This is a powerful challenge to everybody who works in any part of government. The system is fundamentally broken because its components were never designed or intended to act coherently and effectively as a system – and they don’t. There is considerable power in that diagnosis, implying if not quite drawing the conclusion that if you want to change the system, you have to change the system. The problem, of course, is that that is both intrinsically very hard to do and never seems to be as important or urgent as addressing specific policy problems – which is where we came in. So the hard question is not whether a better system could be devised (because there can be little doubt that it could be); it is whether the current system has the capability to make the changes needed. It is hard to stop and start again from scratch. That’s not just true of the UK – it has been argued that the most needed amendment to the US constitution is to make it easier to make constitutional amendments, which is probably impossible. None of that makes Straw’s diagnosis wrong, but it does underline that the route to change is as critical as the destination.
There is a caricature of policy making in which it is presented as an exercise in introspection, free of evidence and free in particular of contact with those who might experience and understand the context and impact of its delivery. Like all good caricatures, there is something recognisable in that, and like all good caricatures, those caricatured more easily see the distortion than the likeness.
The underlying challenge in this post is a good one. Emphasis on things which can be measured distorts attention from things which may be just as important but are more elusive. Understanding the variation around a central figure is as important as understanding the central figure itself – and can tell you very different things. Broader and more qualitative approaches are an essential complement to narrower and more quantitative ones.
But policy makers are people too. Dismissing them as ivory towered elitists is too easy. It would be good to have more empathetic policy makers, but more empathy with policy makers is part of what we need to get there. Policy making is itself the product of a system – and understanding the drivers and behaviours of that system is the essential first step to changing it.
Not at first sight an obvious entry for inclusion here, but indirectly very relevant to thinking about the impact of change on large organisations. The size and complexity of organisations, it is argued, is a function of the relative costs of internal control and market transactions – whether it’s cheaper to make or to buy. That is in turn in part a function of the cost and availability of information. And so the conclusion is reached that digitally-based organisations will be smaller and fleeter of foot than their predecessors and that large ungainly organisations of the pre-internet era are doomed to extinction, with government in their current form being among those whose demise is inevitable.
In some circles, that conclusion is seen as an obvious one. Farrell’s argument is that something critical is missing from the analysis, the self-interest of individuals, and that when that is factored in, the picture looks very different. That matters not to justify slow change in large organisations, but to explain that power relations are a critical part of understanding the overall situation. And as long as they remain unequal, the pop up employer is likely to remain intriguing at the margins, rather than central to how stuff gets done.
Complicated problems can be solved; complex problems can only be managed. Complicated problems can be addressed algorithmically; complex problems require creativity and adaptability. This article is more concerned with describing that distinction then addressing it, though that may just reflect the fact that it is an extract from a book, It’s Not Complicated: The Art and Science of Complexity in Business, which no doubt provides a fuller account.
In a world of complex problems, plans and strategies do not align tidily with results, which is a reason for approaching them differently, rather than not having them. And that in turn requires organisations which can be comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.
A smart and pithy presentation on what strategy is – and isn’t – from the point of view of a digital service designer. Sophie is also the author of Adventures in Policy Land – a reflection by an agile non-government non-policy person on creating government policy in an agile way
This is a post about black elephants: events widely predicted by those in a position to know, but found totally surprising when they actually happen, or elephants in the room retrospectively declared to be black swans. The Grenfell Tower fire was surprising and shocking – and at the same time, predictable. That puts it in a category of things which human institutions seem particularly bad at dealing with, where a problem builds up slowly and almost asymptomatically until suddenly a tipping point is reached, by which time addressing it has become massively more difficult. At one level, the solution to that is obvious – but that doesn’t seem to make it any easier to do in practice.
And it’s perhaps worth saying that this quite abstract way of thinking about disasters is not an attempt to distract from the human tragedy, but on the contrary is a way of recognising and understanding that we need to deal with structural as well as particular issues if we are to see fewer black elephants in future.
Paul Maltby asked on Twitter
What would you put on a reading list for gov policy people eager to dig deeper on digital?
— Paul Maltby (@maltbyps) June 20, 2017
The collected answers – crowd sourced in short order – make up an impressive list. It’s inevitably a bit uneven, but there is a lot of good stuff there, and it’s well worth dipping in to.
— Paul Maltby (@maltbyps) June 21, 2017
Predicting the future is hard. Predicting the second and third order consequences of your first prediction is much harder – but it is those consequential effects which really drive the wider social, economic and other impact. This post is about what happens when vehicles are electric and autonomous, and teases out potential changes ranging from reduced tobacco consumption (because in the US most tobacco is bought at petrol stations) to changing patterns of land use.
It’s a characteristically interesting read – but the reason for including it here is less to do with the cars and more to do with its being an example of a way of thinking about the future. It uses a challenging assumption as a starting point – in this case that autonomous vehicles will change cities as much as cars have done. It focuses less on the initial change and more on the ripples that causes. And it recognises that this can only be a way of exploring possible futures, not of predicting a specific one.
Good policy comes from good policy making. There is plenty of evidence that good policy making is based not just on the rigorous analysis and evidence assessment which is the best of the traditional approach, but also on effective implementation and deep understanding of the needs and behaviour of those who will be affected by the policy. This post argues for a more broadly based approach to policy making, drawing on The Blunders of Our Governments (which remains compelling reading) to make the case.
The problem with this is not – as the author supposes – that it sounds fanciful – it is that it sounds obvious. The problem is not in recognising that policy were better done differently, it is in the doing of it. The post introduces a more substantial paper which has some useful material, but ends up describing barriers to change without offering much about how to overcome them.
A useful diagram with quite a good article wrapped round it. If there is strategic value in organisational alignment, whose responsibility is it for ensuring that that alignment is achieved? Everybody, nobody and the chief executive are all unsatisfactory answers – and the article raises, but doesn’t really attempt to answer, some important questions about how to achieve alignment in a complex organisation under constant pressure to focus on short term issues.
Echoing some of the same themes as Simon Wardley’s approach, this post argues the need for strategies to be developed with an understanding of movement and direction, rather than position – and to forge strong connection between the long term question, ‘where do we want to be?’ and the short term question, ‘what are the key choices we face now which will determine whether we are on the trajectory to get there?’
Strategy is often seen as being about objectives and destinations. But there is no point in wanting to get across an ocean if you don’t have any means of getting there. Disruptive external change demands a response – but the nature of that response depends on where you start from and what means of transport are available, as much as it does on where you think you are trying to get to. Though the advice to set up a pirate camp within sight of the far shore depends on there being usefully positioned islands – and on being able to distinguish the Indies from America.
The efficiency and effectiveness of government is often compared – usually unfavourably – to that of business. From time to time business leaders are brought into government to show how it’s done, usually to withdraw some time later without seeming to have had much impact. One reason for that is that leadership in government and in business make different demands – this post does a good (and non-judgemental) job of explaining some of the reasons why.
Jeff Bezos has a recipe for success. And since it is a recipe which has brought Amazon to a position of dominance, it is one to be taken seriously. His basic message is to avoid ever reaching day 2 – for him a company is either innovating or dying, and even if the death is long drawn out, the process is close to irreversible. Government organisations tend not to feel the same existential threat (which is not to say they are immune to it, or indeed necessarily less vulnerable to it than Amazon realistically is). But his basic principles – resist proxies, embrace external trends and high-velocity decision making – all seem very relevant.
Strategy can be an elusive concept, and it’s tempting to some to conclude that it doesn’t really exist. This post, written firmly from the perspective of a an agile product owner, takes a simple but quite useful approach of positioning strategy as the layer between the vision or mission, at a greater level of abstraction, and the plan and delivery, at a lower level of abstraction. Perhaps not surprisingly, there’s a strong resonance with some of Simon Wardley’s approach too.
Strategy is not the production of documents (still less the document produced). It is an evolving response to the situation an entity finds itself in. Delivery is not a strategy, or at least not unless it is based on a high level of situational awareness. Doing what everybody else is doing, or latching on to trends or buzzwords is also not a strategy, since it is necessarily not distinctive to the entity concerned. Simon Wardley has long challenged – or rather scorned – conventional approaches to business strategy development, this video is a good introduction to his way of thinking.